Self-, other-, and joint monitoring using forward models by Martin J. Pickering & Simon Garrod
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY ARTICLE
published: 25 March 2014
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00132
Self-, other-, and joint monitoring using forward models
Martin J. Pickering1* and Simon Garrod2
1 Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
2 Institute of Neuroscience and Psychology, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
Edited by:
Robert J. Hartsuiker, University of
Ghent, Belgium
Reviewed by:
Daniel Acheson, Max Planck Institute
for Psycholinguistics, Netherlands
Sieb G. Nooteboom, Utrecht Institute
of Linguistics OTS, Netherlands
*Correspondence:
Martin J. Pickering, Department of
Psychology, University of Edinburgh,
7 George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9JZ,
UK
e-mail: martin.pickering@ed.ac.uk
In the psychology of language, most accounts of self-monitoring assume that it is
based on comprehension. Here we outline and develop the alternative account proposed
by Pickering and Garrod (2013), in which speakers construct forward models of their
upcoming utterances and compare them with the utterance as they produce them. We
propose that speakers compute inverse models derived from the discrepancy (error)
between the utterance and the predicted utterance and use that to modify their production
command or (occasionally) begin anew. We then propose that comprehenders monitor
other people’s speech by simulating their utterances using covert imitation and forward
models, and then comparing those forward models with what they hear. They use the
discrepancy to compute inverse models and modify their representation of the speaker’s
production command, or realize that their representation is incorrect and may develop a
new production command. We then discuss monitoring in dialogue, paying attention to
sequential contributions, concurrent feedback, and the relationship between monitoring
and alignment.
Keywords: monitoring, production, comprehension, dialogue, forward models
INTRODUCTION
Most psycholinguists discuss monitoring as a component of
a theory of speaking (or language production), and therefore
refer to it as self-monitoring. In fact, people also perform other-
monitoring, when they monitor their partners during compre-
hension. In this paper, we propose related accounts of self- and
other-monitoring and combine them in an account of monitoring
in dialogue. Our proposals apply Pickering and Garrod (2013)
integrated account of language production and comprehension,
and assume that people predict both their own and their partners’
utterances.
In language production, the dominant view of self-monitoring
involves comprehension (Levelt, 1983, 1989). Speakers monitor
their overt speech and sometimes correct errors or infelicities
after they occur, or they monitor an internal representation of
their planned speech (usually couched in terms of phonology
or phonetics) and sometimes correct errors or infelicities in
that representation. Alternative accounts assume that speakers
monitor by detecting conflicts or degraded representations dur-
ing the production process (e.g., Nozari et al., 2011). In con-
trast, we argue that self-monitoring critically involves prediction
within the production system and a process of comparing pre-
dictions with “implemented” representations constructed during
production.
In addition, people can clearly monitor other people’s speech
as well as their own. We propose that comprehenders make
predictions about speakers’ utterances and compare these pre-
dictions with the speakers’ actual utterances. We refer to this
process as other-monitoring. Comprehenders can then query or
correct speakers’ utterances depending on the circumstances. Our
account of other-monitoring makes use of Pickering and Garrod
(2013) argument that comprehenders’ predictions are typically
based on their own production system (using what we term
“prediction-by-simulation”).
Up to this point, our focus is on monologue or narratives,
where production and comprehension are fairly distinct. The
final part of the paper concerns interactive dialogue, in which
contributions are tightly interwoven, and hence self- and other-
monitoring are also interwoven. Other-monitoring, in particular,
now plays a quite different and more crucial role than it does in
monologue or narrative comprehension.
SELF-MONITORING
As we have noted, self-monitoring is traditionally explained using
the comprehension system. Levelt (1989) account assumes that
speakers monitor via an “outer loop”, whereby they hear what
they say, and the process of comprehension is essentially the same
as comprehending another person’s speech. But speakers also
monitor via an “inner loop”. Levelt (1983) considers a speaker
who utters to the ye- to the orange node when attempting to
describe an orange node as part of a route around a colored
network. The comprehension-based account proposes that the
speaker constructed a representation of yellow at a phonolog-
ical (or phonetic) level, comprehended it (using the compre-
hension system), realized that the resulting meaning (i.e., the
color yellow) did not match the situation or intended meaning,
and reformulated. In other words, the speaker monitored an
“inner” representation. One classic piece of evidence comes from
Motley et al. (1982), who primed participants with word pairs
beginning with particular consonants (e.g., k–t). Participants
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then read a word pair in which the consonants were reversed
(tool-kits) and they sometimes produced a taboo error (cool-
tits). Participants who did not produce a taboo word generated
a heightened galvanic skin response, associated with emotional
arousal.
Importantly, Hartsuiker and Kolk (2001) developed a compu-
tational implementation of Levelt (1989) account that successfully
simulated the distribution of error-to-cutoff and cutoff-to-repair
intervals in relation to speech rate. However, they assumed that
speakers construct the input for “inner loop” monitoring 250 ms
before articulation and therefore provide enough time for the
comprehension system to detect anomalies and interrupt speech.
But more recently, Indefrey and Levelt (2004) estimated that
phonetic encoding and articulation take about 145 ms, and
hence comprehension-based monitoring would have no more
than 145 ms available (and if some of the relevant representations
are phonetic, it might have even less time). In this time, the
speaker would have to perform most of the processes involved in
word comprehension (which takes at least 145 ms; e.g., Sereno
et al., 2003), compare the meaning to the intended utterance, and
reformulate. However, it is possible that speakers might “buffer”
linguistic material by delaying phonetic encoding and articula-
tion on utterances involving pre-articulatory repairs (perhaps as
a result of constructing semantic, syntactic, and phonological
representations more quickly than they can articulate them).
One problem for this proposal is that speeding up articulation
ought to interfere with monitoring and repair, but in fact peo-
ple repair more quickly, when they speak faster (see Postma,
2000).
Moreover, speakers would face the extreme complexity of
comprehending an earlier part of a sentence with the external loop
and a later part with the internal loop (Vigliocco and Hartsuiker,
2002; Nozari et al., 2011). Finally, many patients show a dissoci-
ation between comprehension and self-monitoring (Nozari et al.,
2011). Presumably there must be some form of comprehension-
based monitoring of external speech (though it may be partly
inhibited by prediction and reafference cancellation); the evidence
for “inner-loop” comprehension-based monitoring is much less
clear.
Alternative accounts do not use the comprehension system to
monitor (e.g., Laver, 1980; Schlenk et al., 1987). For example,
Laver assumed that speakers may monitor by detecting problems
with the production process itself. In Levelt (1983) example,
the speaker might construct representations of yellow that are
sufficiently accurate to trigger production processes but which
have significant discrepancies from “canonical” representations.
On this basis, the speaker determines that they may not be
accurate and interrupts production. Although this account has
not been extensively addressed, it is related to MacKay (1987)
Node Structure Theory, which assumes that such representa-
tions appear erroneous because they have not been previously
constructed (i.e., are new to the system). More recently, Nozari
et al. (2011) suggested that speakers detect conflicts between
alternative representations (see Botvinick et al., 2001). Levelt’s
(1983) speaker might have constructed a representation for yellow
but also a (weaker) representation for orange and realized that
these representations conflicted.
A rather different approach assumes that speakers construct
predictions of what they are about to say before they speak and
then compare those predictions with their actual implementation
of speech. Following the action-control tradition, such predic-
tions make use of forward models (see Wolpert, 1997). For exam-
ple, if I decide to move my hand to a particular location, I combine
my intention, my hand’s position in relation to the environment,
and my experience of the outcome of previous similar intentions
to construct a representation of my predicted hand movement.
I might predict that my hand will end up 500 mm from my
body and 30◦ left of my midline, in 300 ms time. Importantly the
prediction will be ready in considerably less than 300 ms, before
the movement. The prediction can then be compared with the
actual movement “when it comes in”.
Such predictions can be quite accurate because I have so much
experience of moving my hand. However, people’s actions are not
entirely accurate; in this case my hand might end up 31◦ left of
my midline. If so, I use the discrepancy (1◦ to the left) as input to
an inverse model that is fed back to modify my intention. If I then
attempt to perform the same act again, I am likely to construct
a more accurate forward model and also to perform a more
accurate act. It is through computing such forward and inverse
models that I first learnt to control the movement efficiently (see
Wolpert et al., 2001). Note that we are simplifying by assuming
that the forward model only plays a role at the point at which the
action is completed. But in fact this is not the case—the forward
model is available on-line, at all points during the movement.
Importantly, in combination with the inverse model, it is used to
“shape” the movement, thus reducing the discrepancy between
actual and predicted movement. Finally, Wolpert et al. assume
the existence of multiple pairs of forward and inverse models,
with the agent continuously attempting to determine which pair
is most accurate. The “error” is of course the discrepancy between
the best (selected) model and the behavior (i.e., the error is
minimized).
Some researchers have proposed related accounts to explain
phonological and articulatory aspects of speech production. Thus,
Tourville and Guenther (2011) described their DIVA (Direction
of Velocities of Articulators) model (and its extension, the Gra-
dient Order DIVA model), which uses auditory and somatosen-
sory forward modeling as part of a computationally explicit
and neurobiologically grounded account of speech production
and acquisition. Similarly, Hickok et al. (2011) proposed a state
feedback control account in which an internal model generates
predictions about the state of the vocal tract and predictions about
the sensory consequences of articulation. Both of these proposals
are focused on prediction (and adaptation) at “low” levels and
do not attempt to generalize to syntactic and semantic aspects of
self-monitoring.
In contrast, Pickering and Garrod (2013) proposed that people
predict their own utterances at the full range of linguistic levels
and use those predictions in self-monitoring. Before speaking,
people construct an intention (called the production command)
and then use forward models to predict characteristics of their
utterance based on this intention and their memory of the out-
come of similar intentions in the past. The account is similar to
Wolpert et al. (2001), except that we assumed that people make
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predictions at different levels of representation, concerned with
meaning, grammar, or sound. Thus, the speaker might predict
that she will produce a noun, a word referring to something
edible, and/or a word beginning with a vowel.
The speaker can then match her predicted percept of the
utterance against her actual percept, using self-monitoring, and
use the discrepancy as input to an inverse model that modifies
the production command and hence the unfolding utterance.
The comparison is direct because the predicted percept is in
the same format as the percept, and therefore no analysis of
the percept is necessary before comparison. This contrasts with
comprehension-based monitoring, in which the utterance has
to be analyzed before comparison is possible. Nozari et al.’s
(2011) conflict-detection account also allows rapid determina-
tion of potential production errors, but does not in itself pro-
vide any basis for correction (Note, however, that Botvinick
et al., 2001, used conflict-detection to bias actions toward
correct choices; it remains to be seen whether an equivalent
account can be developed for language production). According
to our account, the speaker of to the ye- to the orange node
predicted some aspects of the representations associated with
orange before uttering ye-, for example that it begins with the
phoneme
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predictions at different levels of repres ntation, concerned with
meaning, grammar, or sound. Thus, the p aker might predict
that she will produce a noun, a wor r ferring to s mething
edible, and/or a word beginning with a vow l.
The speaker can then match her predi ted percept of he
utterance against her actual percept, ing self-monitoring, a d
use the discrepancy as input to an inv rse model that odifies
the production command and hence the unfolding utteran e.
The comparison is direct because the predicted percept is in
the same format as the percept, and therefore no analysis of
the percept is necessary before comparison. Thi contrasts with
comprehension-based monitoring, in which the utterance has to
be analyzed before comparison is possible. N zari et al. (2011)
conflict-detection account also allows rapid determination of
potential production errors, but does not in itself pr vide any
basis for correction (Note, however, that Botvinick et al., 2001,
used conflict detection to bias actions toward correct choices;
it remains to be seen whether an equivalent account can be
developed for language production). According to our account,
the speaker of to the ye- to the orange node pre icted some aspects
of the representations associated with orange before u tering ye-
, for example that it begins with the . She then pro-
duced the representations associated with the phoneme j, realized
that they did not match, and reformulated. More specifically,
Pickering and Garrod (2013) proposed that speakers generate
a production command i(t) that initiates two processes. First,
it provides the input for the production implementer, which
contains the mechanisms involved in production itself, and out-
puts an utterance p[sem, syn, phon](t), a sequence of sounds that
encodes semantics, syntax, and phonology. The speaker then
uses the comprehension implementer to construct the utterance
percept c[sem, syn, phon](t), the perception of the sequence of
sounds that encodes semantics, syntax, and phonology. Second,
an efference copy of i(t) feeds into a forward production model,
a computational device that outputs the predicted utterance
pˆ[sem, syn, phon]B(t). This in turn feeds into the forward com-
prehension model, which outputs the predicted utterance percept
cˆ[sem, syn, phon]B(t) The utterance percept and predicted utter-
ance percept can be compared by self-monitoring. Pickering and
Garrod (2013) stopped at this point, and did not discuss the
process of comparison, its effects, the mechanisms involved in
reformulation, or the information that feeds into the production
command itself.
The process of comparison involves determining the discrep-
ancy (error) between the utterance percept c[sem, syn, phon](t)
and the predicted utterance percept cˆ[sem, syn, phon](t), which
we call 1[sem, syn, phon](t) (i.e., 1[sem, syn, phon](t) =
c[sem, syn, phon](t)− cˆ[sem, syn, phon](t)). In practice, this
is “unpacked”, so that the speaker computes separate linguistic
levels, for example the phonological percept c[phon](t), the
predicted phonological percept cˆ[phon](t) and their discrepancy
1[phon](t). We assume that the utterance percepts and predicted
utterance percepts can be directly compared and therefore the
discrepancy can be computed. So in Levelt (1983) example, the
phoneme is j, the predicted phoneme is ∝, and the discrepancy
is the difference between j and ∝. In this case, the phonemes are
very different (e.g., sharing few phonetic features) and so the
discrepancy is large; in other cases (e.g., b vs. d), the discrepancy
would be smaller. Importantly, the speaker can represent this
discrepancy wi hout computing all aspects of phonetics, which
migh of cour not be represente in the forward model.
We propose that e discrepancy, 1[sem, syn, phon](t), has a
ifferent eff ct when it is high (large) vs. low (small). When it is
high, t correction would go beyond the scope of the current
forw rd-inv se model pairing, and the speaker has to construct
a new production command (or give up). But when it is low, the
speaker can use his inv se model to correct subsequent predic-
tions directly. Specifically, th monitor feeds the discrepancy back
to the production command and uses it to modify the command
(see Figure 1). If this occurs quickly enough, the speaker simply
changes his utt ance on-line, perhaps pausing or lengthening
th utterance. In other cases, the signal from the inverse model
does not arrive until the implementer is too far advanced, and the
speaker produces s me or all of the originally planned utterance
and then reformulat s, as in Levelt (1983) example.
Note th the representation of the utterance percept in
Figure 1 is a simplification (as discussed in Pickering and Garrod,
2013). The semantic component of the utterance percept (i.e.,
c[sem](t)) is constructed before the syntactic component, which
is in turn computed before the phonological component. The
predicted utterance percept is similarly divided into semantic,
syntactic, and phonological components. Thus it is possible to
perform pre-response monitoring, for example by comparing the
semantic component with the predicted semantic component
“early” in the production process, well before the utterance is
produced. In addition, speakers should notice their own seman-
tic errors early and their phonological errors late, in contrast
FIGURE 1 | Q3Self-monitoring using forward models. The implementer
uses the production command to construct the utterance percept. The
forward models use an efference copy of the production command to
construct the predicted utterance percept. The monitor computes the
discrepancy between the utterance percept and the predicted utterance
percept, which can then be used (as an inverse model) to modify the
production command, or assist in the construction of a new production
command.
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then produced the representa ons ass ciated
with the phoneme j, realized that they did not match, and
reformulated. More specifically, Pickering and Garrod (2013)
proposed that speak rs generate a production command i(t) that
ini iates two proces es. First, it prov des the input for the pro-
duction implementer, which contains the mechanisms involved in
production itself, and outputs an utteran e p[sem, syn, phon](t), a
sequenc of sounds tha encodes sema tics, syntax, and phonol-
ogy. The sp aker then uses the comprehension mplementer to
construc the utterance percept c[sem, yn, phon](t), the ercep-
tion of the sequence of sounds that encodes semantics, syn-
tax, and ph nology. Second, an efference copy of i(t) feeds
into a forward production model, a computational device that
ou puts the predicted utterance pˆ[sem, syn, phon]B(t). This in
turn feeds int the forward comprehension model, which out-
uts th predicted utterance percept cˆ[sem, syn, phon]B(t). The
utt rance pe cept and predicted utterance percept can be com-
pared by self-monitoring. Pickering and Garrod (2013) stopped
at this poi t, and did not discuss the process of compar-
ison, its effects, the mechanisms involved in reformulation,
or the i f rmation that feeds into the production command
itself.
The process of comparison involves determining the discrep-
ancy (error) between the utterance percept c[sem, syn, phon](t)
and the predicted utterance percept cˆ[sem, syn, phon](t), which
we call 1[sem, syn, phon](t) (i.e., 1[sem, syn, phon](t) =
c[sem, sy , phon](t)− cˆ[sem, syn, phon](t)). In practice, this
is “unpacked”, so that the speaker computes separate linguistic
levels, for example the phonological percept c[phon](t), the
predicte phonological percept cˆ[phon](t) and their discrepancy
1[phon](t). We assume hat the utterance percepts and predicted
utterance percepts can be directly compared and th efore the
discrepancy can be computed. So in Levelt’s (1983) example, the
phoneme is j, the predicted phoneme is
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predictions at different levels of representation, concerned with
meaning, grammar, or sound. Thus, the speaker might predict
that she will produce a noun, a word referring to something
edible, and/or a word beginning with a vowel.
The speaker can then match her predicted percept of the
utterance against her actual percept, using self-monitoring, and
use the discrepancy as input to an inverse model that modifies
the production command and hence the unfolding utterance.
The comparison is direct because the predicted percept is in
the same format as the percept, and therefore no analysis of
the percept is necessary before comparison. This contrasts with
comprehension-based monitoring, in which the utterance has to
be analyzed before comparison is possible. Nozari et al. (2011)
conflict-detection account also allows rapid deter ination of
potential production errors, but does not in itself provide any
basis for corre tion (Note, how ver, that Botvinick et al., 2001,
used conflict dete tion to bias actions toward correct choices;
it remains to be seen whether an equivalen account can be
developed f r language o uction). Accor ing to our accou t,
the speak of to the ye- to th orange node predicted some aspects
of the r p sentations ssociated with rang before uttering ye-
, for example that it begins with the phoneme . She then pro-
duced the representati s associated with the phoneme j, realized
that they did not match, and reformulated. More specifically,
Pickering and Garrod (2013) proposed that speakers generate
a production command i(t) that initiates two processes. First,
it provides the input for the production implementer, which
contains the mechanisms involved in production itself, and out-
puts an utterance p[sem, syn, phon](t), a sequence of sounds that
encodes semantics, syntax, and phonology. The speaker then
uses the comprehension implementer to construct the utterance
percept c[sem, syn, phon](t), the perception of the sequence of
sounds that encodes semantics, syntax, and phonology. Second,
an efference copy of i(t) feeds into a forward production model,
a computational device that outputs the predicted utterance
pˆ[sem, syn, phon]B(t). This in turn feeds into the forward com-
prehension model, which outputs the predicted utterance percept
cˆ[sem, syn, phon]B(t) The utterance percept and predicted utter-
ance percept can be compared by self-monitoring. Pickering and
Garrod (2013) stopped at this point, and did not discuss the
process of comparison, its effects, the mechanisms involved in
reformulation, or the information that feeds into the production
command itself.
The process of comparison involves determining the discrep-
ancy (error) between the utterance percept c[sem, syn, phon](t)
and the predicted utterance percept cˆ[sem, syn, phon](t), which
we call 1[sem, syn, phon](t) (i.e., 1[sem, syn, phon](t) =
c[sem, syn, phon](t)− cˆ[sem, syn, phon](t)). In practice, this
is “unpacked”, so that the speaker computes separate linguistic
levels, for example the phonological percept c[phon](t), the
predicted phonological percept cˆ[phon](t) and their discrepancy
1[phon](t). We assume that the utterance percepts and predicted
utterance percepts can be directly compared and therefore the
discrepancy can be computed. So in Levelt (1983) example, the
phoneme is j, the predicted phoneme is ∝, and the discrepancy
is the difference between j and ∝. In this case, the phonemes are
very different (e.g., sharing few phonetic features) and so the
discrepancy is large; in other cases (e.g., b vs. d), the discrepancy
would be smaller. Importantly, the speaker can represent this
discrepancy without computing all aspects of phonetics, which
might of course not be represented in the forward model.
We propose that the discrepancy, 1[sem, syn, phon](t), has a
different effect when it is high (large) vs. low (small). When it is
high, the correction would go beyond the scope of the current
forward-inverse model pairing, and the speaker has to construct
a new production command (or give up). But when it is low, the
speaker can use his inverse model to correct subsequent predic-
tions directly. Specifically, the monitor feeds the discrepancy back
to the production command and uses it to modify the command
(see Figure 1). If this occurs quickly enough, the speaker simply
changes his utterance on-line, perhaps pausing or lengthening
the utterance. In other cases, the signal from the inverse model
do s not arrive until the implementer is too far advanced, and the
speaker produces some or all of the originally planned utterance
and t en reformulates, as in Levelt (1983) example.
Not that the representation of the utterance percept in
Figure 1 is a simplification (as discussed in Pickering and Garrod,
2013). The semantic component of the utterance percept (i.e.,
c[sem](t)) is constructed before the syntactic component, which
is in turn computed before the phonological component. The
predicted utterance percept is similarly divided into semantic,
syntactic, and phonological components. Thus it is possible to
perform pre-response monitoring, for example by comparing the
semantic component with the predicted semantic component
“early” in the production process, well before the utterance is
produced. In addition, speakers should notice their own seman-
tic errors early and their phonological errors late, in contrast
FIGURE 1 | Q3Self-monitoring using forward models. The implementer
uses the production command to construct the utterance percept. The
forward models use an efference copy of the production command to
construct the predicted utterance percept. The monitor computes the
discrepancy between the utterance percept and the predicted utterance
percept, which can then be used (as an inverse model) to modify the
production command, or assist in the construction of a new production
command.
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predictions at different levels of representation, concerned with
meaning, gr mmar, or sound. Thus, the speaker might predict
that she will produce a noun, a word referring to something
edible, and/or a word beginni g with a vowel.
The speaker can then match her redic ed percept of the
utterance against her actual percept, using self-monitoring, and
use the discre ancy as i put to inverse model that mo fies
the production command and h nce the unfolding utt ranc .
The comparison is di ect because the redicted percept is in
the same format as the percept, and therefore n analysis of
the percept is necessary befor comparison. This contrasts with
comprehensio -bas monitoring, in which the utterance has to
be analyzed before comparison is possible. Nozari et al. (2011)
conflict-detection acc unt also allows rapid determi ation of
potential production errors, but does not in i s lf pro de any
basis for c rrecti (Not , however, t t Bo vi ick et al., 2001,
used confli t detec ion to bias actions toward correct choices;
it remains to be s en whether an eq iv lent a u t can be
developed for langu g pro uction). Accor ng o o r a count,
the speaker f to the y - to the orange nod pre icted some asp cts
of the repres ntat ons associa d with orange before utt ring ye-
, for example that it begins wi h the phon me . She then pro-
duced the representations associ ted with the phoneme j, realized
that they did not match, nd reformulated. More specifically,
Pickering and Garrod (2013) proposed that speakers generat
a product on command i(t) that ini iates two processes. First,
it provides the input for the production implementer, which
contains the mechanisms involved in production itself, and ut-
puts an utteranc p[sem, syn, pho ](t), sequence of sounds that
encodes semantics, syntax, and phonology. The speaker hen
uses the comprehen ion implementer to construct the utteranc
percept c[ em, syn, phon](t), the perception of the sequence of
sounds th t encodes semantics, syntax, a d phonology. Second,
an efference py of i(t) feeds into a forward production model,
a computational device tha outputs he predicted u terance
pˆ[sem, syn, phon]B(t). This in turn feeds into the forward com-
prehension model, which outputs the predict d utt rance percept
cˆ[sem, syn, phon]B(t) The utt rance percept and predicted utter-
ance percept can be compared by self-monit ring. Pickering an
Garrod (2013) stopped at this point, and did not discu s the
process of comparison, its eff cts, the mechanisms involved in
reformulati n, or the information that feeds into the production
command itself.
The process of c mparison involves determining the discrep-
ancy (error) between the utterance percept c[sem, syn, phon](t)
and the predicted utterance percept cˆ[sem, syn, phon](t), which
we call 1[sem, syn, phon](t) (i.e., 1[sem, syn, phon](t) =
c[sem, syn, phon](t)− cˆ[sem, syn, p on](t)). In ractice, this
is “unpack d”, so that the speaker computes separate linguistic
levels, for example the phonological percept c[phon](t), the
predicted phon logical percept cˆ[p on](t) and their discrepancy
1[phon](t). We assume tha the utt ranc percepts and predic ed
utterance perc ts an be directly compared and therefore the
discrepancy can b computed. So in Levelt (1983) example, the
phoneme j, the predi ted phoneme is , a d the discrepancy
is the difference between j and ∝. In this case, the phonemes are
very different (e.g., sharin few p onetic features) an so the
discrepancy is large; in other cases (e.g., b vs. d), the discrepancy
would be smaller. Importantly, the speaker can represent this
discrepancy wi hout computing all aspects of p onetics, which
might of course not be r presented in th forward model.
W propose that the discrepancy, 1[sem, syn, ph n](t), has a
differ nt effect w n it is h gh (large) vs. low (small). When it is
high, the c rection would go beyond the scop of the current
forward-inverse m el pairing, and the speak r has to construct
a new production ommand (or give up). Bu when it is low, th
speaker can use his inverse mode to correct subsequent predic-
tions directly. Specifically, the monitor fee s the discrepancy back
to the production command and uses it to modify the command
(s e Figure 1). If this occu s quickly e ough, the s eaker simp y
changes his utterance on-line, perhaps pau ing or lengt ning
t e utteranc . I other cases, t e signal from the inverse model
doe not rrive until the imple nter is too far adva ced, and the
speaker produces some or a l of the riginally plann d utterance
nd th n reformula es, as in Lev lt (1983) example.
Note that the representation of the utterance percept i
Figure 1 is a simplification (as discussed in Pickering and Garrod,
2013). The e antic component of the utt rance percept (i.e.,
c[sem](t)) is constructed before the syn actic component, which
is in turn computed b fore the phonologica component. The
predicted utteran e percept is similarly divided into semantic,
syntactic, and phonological comp ents. Thus it is ossible to
perform pr -response onitoring, for example by compari g the
seman ic component with the predicted emantic c mponent
“early” in the pro uction pr ces , well before the utterance is
produced. In addition, spe kers should notice their own seman-
tic errors early and their phonological errors late, in contrast
FIGURE 1 | Q3Self-monitoring using forward models. The implementer
uses the production command to construct the utterance percept. The
forward models use an efference copy of the production co mand to
construct the predicted utterance percept. The monitor computes the
discrepancy between the utterance percept and the predicted utterance
percept, which can then be used (as an inverse model) to modify the
production command, or assist in the construction of a new production
command.
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In this cas , the phon mes ar
very different (e.g., sharing few phonetic features) and so the
discrepancy i large; in other cases (e.g., b vs. d), the discrepancy
would be smaller. Importantly, the speaker can represent this
discrepancy without computing all aspects of phonetics, which
might of course not be represented in the forward model.
We propose that the discrepancy, 1[sem, syn, phon](t), has a
different effect when it i high (large) vs. low (small). When it is
high, the correction would go beyond the scope of the current
forward-inverse model pairing, and the speaker has to construct
a new production command (or give up). But when it is low, the
speaker can use his invers model to correct subsequent predic-
ti ns directly. Sp cifically, the monitor feeds the discrepancy back
to the production command and uses it to modify the command
(see Figure 1). If this occurs quickly enough, the speaker simply
chan es his utterance on-line, perhaps pausing or lengthening
the utterance. In other cases, the signal from the inverse model
does not arrive until the implementer is too far advanced, and the
speaker produces some or all of the originally planned utterance
and then reformula es, as in Levelt’s (1983) example.
Note that the representation of the utterance percept in
Figure 1 is a sim lification (as discussed in Pickering and Garrod,
2013). The semantic component of the utterance percept (i.e.,
c[sem](t)) is constructed before the syntactic component, which
is in turn computed before the phonological component. The
predicted utteranc percept is similarly divided into semantic,
syntact c, and phonologi al components. Thus it is possible to
perform pre-respon e monitoring, for example by comparing the
s mantic component with the predicted semantic component
“early” in the productio process, well before the utterance is
produced. In addition, speakers should notice their own seman-
tic errors early a d their phonological errors late, in contrast
FIGURE 1 | Self-monitoring using forward models. The implementer
uses the production command to construct the utterance percept. The
forward mod ls use an efference copy of the production command to
construct the predicted utterance percept. The monitor computes the
discrepan y betwe n the utterance erc pt and the predicted uttera ce
perc pt, which can then be used (as an inverse model) to modify the
production command, or assist in the construction of a new production
command.
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to comprehension-based monitoring accounts (Levelt, 1983), in
which speakers comprehend the phonology of their prepared
utterance before determining its semantics.
Notice that this account assumes that error-detection and
repair involve “revisiting” the production command (i.e., the
intention underlying speaking) and do not simply involve “patch-
ing up” a stage in production (e.g., phonology). This is analogous
to the correction of motor movement—when an agent creates
an action plan to move her arm to X and in fact moves it to
Y, the discrepancy (Y–X) is used to modify the action plan. In
other words, monitoring and repair involve intentional mecha-
nisms. It is, however, possible that an inverse model generated
from comparing, say, the phonological percept and the predicted
phonological percept might feed back to a stage of implementa-
tion, for example concerned with semantics. However, we pro-
pose that such an inverse model would be accompanied by an
inverse model feeding back to the production command (as in
Figure 1).
There is considerable evidence for the use of forward models
in language production (see Pickering and Garrod, 2013). In an
magnetoencephalography (MEG) study, Tian and Poeppel (2010)
had participants imagine producing a syllable, and found the
same rapid response in auditory cortex as when they articulated
(see also Tian and Poeppel, 2013). This suggests that even when
imagining speaking, people use a forward model to construct
the predicted utterance percept incorporating phonological infor-
mation. In another MEG study, Heinks-Maldonado et al. (2006)
found that the M100 (i.e., occurring about 100 ms post-stimulus)
was reduced when people spoke and concurrently listened to their
own unaltered speech vs. a pitch-shifted distortion of the speech.
Tourville et al. (2008) provided evidence about the process
of error correction using altered speech. They had participants
read monosyllabic words aloud and distorted feedback by shifting
the first formant up or down on a small proportion of trials.
They found that participants shifted their speech in the opposite
direction very rapidly, within about 100 ms for downward shifts.
Pickering and Garrod (2013) noted that such rapid compensation
provides strong evidence that self-monitoring involves prediction
within the production system. Speakers construct a predicted
utterance percept based on the efference copy of their production
command, which we assume to be accurate—say, cˆ[F1](t) = x Hz
(We use F1 to refer to first formant, and regard it simplistically
as an aspect of phon). On the trials in which the first formant
was decreased by 30%, c[F1](t) = 0.7x Hz, and hence 1[F1](t) =
−0.3x Hz. This discrepancy is fed into the production command
using the inverse model (see Figure 1), and the production
command can then be modified on-line so that F1 is shifted
upwards (Presumably the feedback is targeted at the aspect of
the production command that deals with F1, so there is no need
to revisit other aspects of the production command). We can
similarly explain effects of adaptation to ambient noise (Lombard
effects; e.g., Lane and Tranel, 1971).
In language production, most monitoring leads to low
(“small”) discrepancies, because speakers tend to prepare utter-
ances that are largely compatible with their intention (produc-
tion command). This means that the discrepancy can be used
to modify the production command (In Levelt’s example it is
presumably possible to correct the semantics and then recompute
phonology). As an example, Boland et al. (2005) had participants
plan descriptions of objects (e.g., dark blue square) which they
then modified before speaking. On the basis of their results, they
argued that speakers could delete words (e.g., producing blue
square) from their current plan, thus revising their plan rather
than starting afresh.
However, it is also possible that the discrepancy is “high”,
and the predicted utterance percept is sufficiently unrelated to
the utterance percept that the speaker is forced to construct a
new production command. If so, the speaker has to appeal to
“general knowledge” (thinking) and leaves the language process-
ing mechanism. As an example, consider the effects of shifting
F1 considerably more than 30% using Tourville et al.’s (2008)
paradigm. At some point, participants would presumably stop
compensating for the discrepancy. They might reason about the
cause of the discrepancy and make an explicit decision about
how to react. Such a process would not be internal to language
processing.
A related situation occurs when a relevant aspect of the envi-
ronment changes as the speaker is referring to it. For example,
a football commentator might be describing a particular player’s
possession of the ball when he is suddenly tackled. In one set
of experiments, participants named pictures which occasionally
changed into different pictures during naming (Hartsuiker et al.,
2005; Tydgat et al., 2012; cf. Van Wijk and Kempen, 1987).
Participants sometimes interrupted themselves while naming the
first picture. In at least these cases, they replaced their production
command on the basis of a change in the world (i.e., external to
Figure 1). Again, the discrepancy is large (though note that the
response may not be regarded as an error).
Note that there is much evidence that the implementer con-
structs parallel representations which in some cases feed into
later stages of processing (e.g., Peterson and Savoy, 1998). More-
over, activation appears to cascade across stages, so that speakers
begin to construct representations at later levels before repre-
sentations at earlier levels are complete (e.g., Goldstein et al.,
2007; McMillan and Corley, 2010). At least some of the time,
the implementer therefore appears to entertain more than one
alternative representation at the same level or at different levels.
Such cascading activation is not problematic for forward models.
In fact, Pickering and Garrod (2013) assumed that speakers simul-
taneously construct forward models corresponding to different
levels of representation. At a particular level, they could construct
a single forward model corresponding to one implementation.
Alternatively, they could entertain multiple forward models in
parallel at a particular level, as assumed in at least one account
of motor control (MOdular Selection And Identification for
Control (MOSAIC; Haruno et al., 2001)). If so, the speaker
could use the smallest prediction error as input to the inverse
model. For example, if I predict both couch and sofa, and I
implement conch, the input to the inverse model would be the
(phonological) discrepancy between conch and couch (Parallel
prediction is likely to be more central to comprehension, as we
shall see).
Finally, we note that conflict-monitoring accounts (e.g.,
Nozari et al., 2011) may be consistent with forward modeling
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if the detected conflict is between predicted and implemented
representations. A particular advantage of involving forward
modeling is that the forward model is likely to be accurate (as
it is the result of learning intention-outcome mappings), and can
therefore guide the process of correction. In addition, it has the
benefit of extending to other-monitoring with the same basic
system (see below).
OTHER MONITORING
Just as speakers can monitor their own utterances, so comprehen-
ders can monitor speakers’ utterances. For example, people can
reformulate to remove their own speech errors or infelicities. In a
similar way, they can propose corrections of other people’s utter-
ances or query those utterances (in a way that perhaps prompts
the original speaker to reformulate). Under some circumstances,
such reformulations (and queries) are very common and spon-
taneous, as in parent-child dialogue (e.g., Chouinard and Clark,
2003); they are of course also central to instructional dialogue. We
argue that comprehenders constantly perform other-monitoring,
in that they predict speakers’ utterances and compare those pre-
dictions with their actual utterances as they unfold (for a com-
parable proposal, see Van de Meerendonk et al., 2009). They can
then use any discrepancies in various ways including other-repair.
On our account, other-monitoring is related to self-monitoring.
Below, we outline this account, and then contrast cases where
comprehenders cannot usefully respond (e.g., listening to the
radio) and cases where they do (as may happen when listening
to a co-present narrator).
Let us return to the example of hand movement. When I
see you starting to move your hand, I use forward modeling to
predict where your hand will end up, before you move your hand,
and then compare this with your actual movement. Pickering
and Garrod (2013) proposed that there are two “routes” to
prediction. Their focus is on prediction-by-simulation, which is
used for actions performed by other people. We have already
noted that people develop forward models in order to learn and
control their actions, and use these models to predict action
outcomes. Such forward models are therefore available to predict
other people’s actions as well. To do this, Pickering and Garrod
proposed that people covertly imitate each other’s actions and
derive the action command underlying their upcoming action
(while compensating for differences between them). They then
use this action command to construct a forward model of the
predicted outcome of the action. To predict your hand movement,
I covertly imitate your movements and then use the result of this
imitation to construct a prediction as when predicting my own
hand movement (e.g., Haruno et al., 2001).
Pickering and Garrod (2013) also proposed that people use
prediction-by-association. This route to prediction is based on
perceptual experiences alone. Thus, I predict on the basis of
experience of other people (including you) moving their hands
in the past. In fact, I can predict the movement of inanimate
objects in the same way. Prediction-by-association does not have
access to the processes involved in learning and correcting one’s
own actions, though it can instead benefit from correction of
perceptual predictions. We assume that people combine both
types of prediction in action perception.
As language comprehension is a form of action perception,
it can also involve prediction-by-simulation. The comprehender
A hears the start of B’s utterance (e.g., I want to fly my), and
covertly imitates it, then uses an inverse model and context (which
constitutes information about the differences between A and B’s
language mechanisms) to derive the production command that
B would use to produce the utterance so far. A then runs it
ahead to derive the production command for the next part of
the utterance (here, kite). A then constructs an efference copy
of this command to input into the forward models and output
the predicted utterance percept—in this case, components of the
experience associated with saying kite. Meanwhile, B continues
with his utterance, either saying kite or some other word. A
can then compare the predicted with the actual utterance using
other-monitoring.
We explain this process in more detail using Figure 2, which
is based on Figure 6 from Pickering and Garrod (2013), but
both simplified and extended, as it considers the output of the
monitor. We refer to the discrepancy between the comprehen-
der’s predicted utterance percept cˆ[sem, syn, phon]B(t + 1) and
the comprehender’s utterance percept c[sem, syn, phon]B(t + 1)
as 1[sem, syn, phon]B(t + 1). This is the same as in production,
except that we have added the subscript B to refer to the speaker.1
In one sense, the use of the discrepancy is the same in self-
and other-monitoring. But the comprehender has much less solid
information about the speaker’s production command than the
speaker does. This means that the comprehender’s prediction
will often be significantly inaccurate—big discrepancies are much
more common than in production. Hence it will often not be pos-
sible to use the inverse model to modify the derived production
command. Informally, the comprehender fails to work out what
the speaker “means” and leaves the language processing system, as
discussed below.
Moreover, the effect of modifying or reformulating the pro-
duction command is rather different in comprehension. Self-
monitoring enables speakers to check that their communicative
intentions have been correctly implemented. In other words, the
predicted utterance directly reflects the speaker’s intention and
any discrepancy in the perceived utterance can be corrected to
conform to this intention. (We assume that mature speakers of
a language rarely make erroneous predictions about their own
utterances.) By contrast, other-monitoring enables listeners to
check that their predictions about the other’s utterance corre-
spond (at some level) with what the other actually says. Any
discrepancy can then be used to do two things. First, it can
lead to the listener updating his prediction of the upcoming
utterance by modifying the next derived production command
(as indicated above). This rapid updating therefore helps the
listener make predictions as quickly and effectively as possible.
1In fact, the inverse model is already used to derive the production command
which leads to original prediction (see Figure 6 of Pickering and Garrod,
2013). This “original” use of the inverse model is based on the utterance
percept alone as there is no predicted utterance percept (and hence the
utterance percept equals the discrepancy). Our new use of the inverse model
in fact leads to the derived production command iB(t + 1)which in turn leads
to the derived production command iB(t + 1), which is then used to update
the prediction. (Note also that we assume that the context remains constant.)
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FIGURE 2 | Other-monitoring using forward models. Information above
the line (and underlined) refers to B, and indicates the representations
underlying the utterance at time t and the upcoming utterance. The arrow is
dotted because the relationship between the two representations is not
causal for A. A uses covert imitation, including access to the inverse model
and context (i.e., differences between A and B) to derive B’s production
command, and then uses forward models to derive the predicted utterance
percept. A then comprehends B’s utterance and compares the utterance
percept and the predicted utterance percept. The output of the comparison
is the discrepancy between the predicted and actual percepts, and it
provides the input to the inverse model that can be subsequently used to
modify the derived production command.
Second, the discrepancy can be used to indicate the degree to
which the other’s utterance conforms to the listener’s predic-
tion (in other words, the extent to which it makes sense for
the listener). If the discrepancy is large, the listener realizes
that his prediction is very different from the speaker’s utter-
ance. This provides a cue to the listener to seek the reason
for the discrepancy (“I’ve been misinterpreting her—I wonder
why?”).
An additional complication is that the listener A may vary
in his confidence about both B’s utterance and about his ability
to predict B’s utterance. For example, if B’s utterance is partly
obscured by noise, then A will be less confident about what he
heard than otherwise. In this case, A will tend to place more faith
in the predicted utterance percept. Similarly, if A is unsure about
B’s background knowledge (e.g., whether B shares A’s cultural
expectations about things that people tend to fly), then A may
be less confident about predicting B’s utterance (in this case,
the word kite) than otherwise. In this case, A will tend to place
more faith in the actual utterance percept. To model this, we
assume a variable, CONU, to refer to confidence in the utterance.
A complete account would assume another variable, CONP, to
refer to confidence in the prediction (but we do not discuss this
further).
Under conditions with little background noise, we assume
that CONU is high, and so the inverse model (and hence the
modification to the production command) is largely dependent
on the utterance percept.2 Under less clear conditions when
2We assume that speakers are very confident about their own implemented
representations during self-monitoring. They may have “privileged access” to
background noise is high or the utterance itself is unclear (i.e.,
CONU is low), A may “assume he misheard” and not modify
his production command. Lack of clarity is much more likely
for a single phoneme than a whole word (or phrase), and it
may be that normal speech is perceived as “noisy” from the
point of view of the phoneme. In phoneme-restoration experi-
ments (Warren, 1970), a word is strongly predicted (both because
it fits the context and because people tend to utter complete
words). The comprehender “sticks with” the predicted utterance
percept (the phoneme) and the discrepancy is (near to) zero.
Thus the missing phoneme does not cause the comprehender
to modify his production command. Interestingly, it is in just
such “noisy” non-ideal conditions that motor areas become most
active during speech perception (Scott et al., 2009; Adank, 2012;
D’Ausilio et al., 2012). This is consistent with listeners relying
more on prediction-by-simulation when CONU is low than when
it is high.
We now focus on cases where confidence in both the prediction
and the utterance are high. Considering the first consequence of
other-monitoring, it will often be possible to use the discrep-
ancy to modify the derived production command “internally”.
This is the case when the discrepancy is low, a situation which
is less ubiquitous than in language production but which we
assume is still typical. The derived production command will
then be modified to follow the utterance percept. After I’m going
to ride my, the comprehender A predicts bike. However, the
speaker B may actually say /s/ rather than /k/ (at time t + 1).
At this point, A predicts that B has uttered the start of bicycle
rather than bike. The comprehender A may then modify his
derived production command using the discrepancy between
these phonemes and use it to predict that B will now say the
final phonemes of bicycle (at t + 2). Considering the second
consequence of other-monitoring, the listener is unlikely to notice
the small discrepancy between predicted and actual utterance
(or realize that his prediction has changed)—changes internal to
the derived production command do not (normally) result in
awareness.
But what happens when the discrepancy is sufficiently high
that the comprehender cannot modify the derived production
command? We propose that he has to construct a new derived
production command, and to do this, he must make use of
mechanisms additional to those included in Figure 2. This means
that updating of the predictions will tend to be slower than
is the case for small discrepancies. In addition, comprehenders
will often seek an explanation for the discrepancy (as noted
above). There are two possible mechanisms for constructing a
new derived production command: The comprehender can work
out in his head what is going on (internal modification), or the
comprehender can query the speaker (external modification). We
consider these in turn.
their utterance percept, or the chances of internal misperception of their own
implemented representations is negligible. In contrast, they may misperceive
their own articulated utterance, when using comprehension-based “external
loop” monitoring. Under most conditions, we expect the discrepancy to
be larger in comprehension than production (but see Joint Monitoring in
Dialogue section for qualification).
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 132 | 6
Pickering and Garrod Self-, other-, and joint monitoring
INTERNAL MODIFICATION
If other-monitoring produces a sufficiently large mismatch
between predicted and actual utterance, the comprehender can-
not directly update the derived production command and is
therefore forced to draw on information from outside the lan-
guage system by appealing to general knowledge. Informally, he
asks “what can the speaker have meant?” When listening to the
radio (for example), he has to hope that he can answer this
question sufficiently quickly that he can “catch up”, or else must
accept a gap in his understanding. When listening to a podcast
(or while reading), he can also decide to resample by replaying
some or all of what he has heard (or instigating a regressive eye-
movement in reading).
Unless resampling is possible, the comprehender attempts to
determine what he does not understand about the situation—in
which case he appeals to general knowledge—or the knowledge
about the speaker—in which case he appeals to his theory of
mind. In the latter case, he “mentalizes”: he uses explicit rea-
soning about the speaker and his assumptions about theory of
mind to determine how to interpret the utterance. Even if the
comprehender can in principle resolve the discrepancy internally,
a large discrepancy may take a lot of time to resolve and general
knowledge or theory of mind may therefore be brought to bear
(without it being strictly necessary).
To a large extent, other-monitoring is concerned with deter-
mining whether the comprehender’s estimate of the speaker’s
communicative intention (i.e., derived production command) is
correct. It therefore engages mechanisms associated with theory
of mind, and hence a large discrepancy is likely the result of a
disconnect between a belief about the speaker’s intention and a
realization of that intention. In such cases, we expect extensive
activation of networks associated with theory of mind (in order
to help resolve the discrepancy).
In relation to this, Bašnáková et al. (2013) carried out an
fMRI study contrasting direct and indirect replies to questions.
People listened to utterances such as It is hard to give a good
presentation as either a direct reply to a question (e.g., How hard
is it to give a good presentation?) or an indirect reply (e.g., to
Did you like my presentation?). Listening to indirect in contrast
to direct replies activated a large frontal and medial prefrontal
network, including brain regions previously implicated in mental-
izing and empathy (medial frontal cortex (MFC), right temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ), and the anterior insula) (see Amodio
and Frith, 2006). Understanding an indirect reply requires deter-
mining the pragmatic relationship between it and the question,
and pragmatics involves the beliefs, knowledge and intentions
of the participants in the speech event (Levinson, 1983). So
when a comprehender interprets a reply directly, but then realizes
that it does not make sense, he is forced to engage theory of
mind in reanalysis. The same would be true if the comprehen-
der changes from one indirect interpretation of an utterance to
another.
We propose that comprehenders quite often fail to predict that
they will get a particular form of indirect response to a question.
When this happens, the discrepancy between the predicted and
actual utterance requires the comprehender to involve mecha-
nisms outside the language system. In particular, he revises the
production command and makes use of mentalizing networks to
do so.
Some evidence suggests that difficulty in language comprehen-
sion leads to activation of brain structures associated with con-
flict resolution that reflects the need to select among competing
alternatives (see Novick et al., 2010). Such difficulty can be due
to conflict between the utterance percept and top-down processes
which presumably help generate the predicted utterance percept
(see also Slevc and Novick, 2013). January et al. (2009) found that
comprehension of garden-path sentences (in which the syntactic
structure turns out to be incompatible with the predicted struc-
ture) led to similar activation of the Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus
(LIFG) to that found in a Stroop task (which involves general-
purpose conflict). We propose that comprehenders are unable to
modify the production command quickly to deal with the new
syntactic structure and hence call on non-linguistic mechanisms
that are used in conflict resolution. In conclusion, comprehen-
ders may need to revise the production command because of a
discrepancy in pragmatic interpretation or syntactic analysis (and
perhaps for other reasons as well).
EXTERNAL MODIFICATION
In many cases, addressees can respond to the speaker. This is
perhaps analogous to a perceiver moving his eyes or head to
interpret an ambiguous percept. Of course, speakers are at least
potentially affected by addressees’ responses (e.g., Krauss and
Weinheimer, 1966; Bavelas et al., 2000), so such responses may
prove effective in improving the speaker’s contribution. Types
of response include looks of puzzlement or surprise, queries,
acknowledgments, and contributions to the narrative (see Clark,
1996).
An illustrative example comes from Drew (1997):3
(1) Hal: an’ Leslie ’t was marv’lous (.) D’you know he had (.) forty
nine g’rillas. .hh th-there. (b) (.) br[eeding in ( )
Lesley: [pf- f- Forty nine wha:t?
Hal: G’rillas.
Lesley: hh Oh ye-s?
While listening to Hal’s first utterance, Lesley presumably does
not predict that Hal will refer to gorillas at that point. Instead,
she predicts that Hal will refer to something that people typically
have forty nine of (e.g., small or cheap things). She then hears
g’rillas and presumably interprets the word correctly (via the
implementer) and has high confidence in this interpretation (i.e.,
CONU is high). However, the discrepancy between her semantic
prediction and the semantics of gorillas is too great to resolve
by modifying the derived production command. She could have
attempted to construct a new derived command internally but
this might not have been successful. She instead queried Hal by
uttering Forty nine wha:t? (It may be that Lesley heard enough of
breeding to determine that Hal in fact intended to refer to gorillas
and therefore decided to check Hal’s utterance.) This external
modification specifically identifies the locus of difficulty and thus
3(.) indicates brief pause; [indicates overlap; : indicates lengthening; .hh
indicates long inhalation. We have added bold font for illustrative purposes.
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allowed Hal to utter g’rillas again. Before Hal says this, Lesley is
likely to predict that Hal will refer to gorillas and so there is very
little discrepancy between Lesley’s predicted utterance percept
and the actual percept. At this point, Lesley appears to indicate
understanding (Oh ye-s?).
In conclusion, Lesley was unable (or unwilling) to resolve her
derived production command internally, and instead resorted to
external modification, to get herself back on track. We have there-
fore seen how external modification can be treated as a strategy
for other-monitoring; below we consider its broader implications
for joint monitoring in dialogue.
JOINT MONITORING IN DIALOGUE
This last example occurred in the context of a dialogue in which
an addressee queried her interlocutor. However, there is also
a sense in which successful dialogue depends on a somewhat
different kind of monitoring than monologue. In this section, we
consider the monitoring of sequential contributions to dialogue
and then turn to concurrent feedback. Finally, we discuss the way
in which alignment facilitates monitoring and then consider the
monitoring of alignment itself.
MONITORING OF SEQUENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO DIALOGUE
When A reaches to in the utterance I would like to drink a beer
(time t), A predicts that A will utter drink at t + 1 and a beer
at t + 2, and B also predicts A’s utterance at t + 1 and t + 2
(though in general B’s predictions will be less accurate than A’s).
These predictions form the basis for self- and other-monitoring
as discussed above.
Now consider a simple dialogue consisting of a question and
an answer:
(2) A: What would you like to drink?
B: A beer, please.
We can think of this pair of contributions as distributing a
single utterance over two interlocutors. After A says to at time t,
A predicts that she will utter drink at t + 1, and also that B will
respond at t + 2. Similarly, B predicts what A will say at t + 1 and
will use this to predict his response at t + 2. Thus, both A and B’s
predictions are also distributed across both participants.
As Pickering and Garrod (2013) pointed out, a well-
coordinated dialogue such as a question followed by an appro-
priate answer is as coherent as an utterance by a single speaker.
Thus making predictions about such a dialogue is of similar
complexity to making predictions about an utterance by a single
speaker. Hence forming such predictions in dialogue should not,
in principle, be harder than forming predictions in monologue
because they are sequential—the only complication is that the
predictions need to be “tagged” with the person that they are
predictions about. These predictions therefore allow both partic-
ipants to monitor dialogue, just as they can monitor monologue.
When A is speaking, A uses self-monitoring (Figure 1) and B uses
other-monitoring (Figure 2); when B is speaking, A uses other-
monitoring and B uses self-monitoring.
Although the mechanisms for this type of dialogue are sim-
ilar to those in monologue, the ways in which they are used
is different. When A utters What would you like to drink?, A
realizes that B’s response is highly constrained by A’s question,
the situational context, and the assumption that B will obey the
conventions of adjacency pairs (Sacks et al., 1974)—primarily,
that a direct question requires a timely, relevant answer (or
something that queries the question). If A and B are in a pub,
then A predicts that B will respond with an alcoholic or soft
drink (from a limited set). So questioners make strong predictions
about the timing and linguistic properties of the response (e.g.,
0–2 s, DRINK, noun phrase). Moreover, the questioner “plants”
a type of production command in the answerer and uses her
derivation of that command to drive her forward modeling of
answerer’s predicted response. It is therefore clear how the ques-
tioner can tightly integrate her own and the answerer’s production
commands. The answerer also predicts that his response is con-
strained by the question. In our example, B derives A’s production
command and the associated predicted response (alcoholic or soft
drink). Assuming that B follows convention, he is constrained to
produce a response that is compatible with this prediction. Like
the questioner, the answerer tightly integrates both production
commands.
To explicate the process of monitoring, let us consider dif-
ferent situations. At a dinner party, A might predict that B
would respond with red wine or white wine—this is A’s derived
representation of B’s production command. In our example, B’s
response might therefore lead to a minor discrepancy. At this
point, A would compute the discrepancy (informally, wine minus
beer) and use this to drive the inverse model to modify the
derived production command. But at a tea party, B’s response
might be sufficiently discrepant from A’s prediction (white tea or
black tea) that A would not be able to use the inverse model to
modify the derived production command and would instead leave
the language processing mechanism. Such a discrepant response
would presumably activate mechanisms associated with theory
of mind and general-purpose conflict resolution (see Internal
Modification section). In conclusion, the mechanisms of self- and
other-monitoring apply to such forms of dialogue, and become
interwoven just as speaking and listening become interwoven.
We propose a similar account for other types of split utterance.
For example, a speaker can encounter difficulties producing a
complete utterance, perhaps because of problems with lexical
selection. In such cases, an addressee can then provide a missing
component by proxy (A: That tree has . . . uh . . .uh; B: tentworms;
Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). It may be that A is soliciting a
particular type of response, and if B realizes this, then the situation
is closely analogous to question-and-answer. Alternatively, A may
not be soliciting a response, in which case B’s interjection is more
surprising. If so, the discrepancy will tend to be large and A will
be more likely to face a conflict. Such conflict is also likely in cases
of true interruption, or when the addressee produces a hostile
continuation to make a point (e.g., A: In fact what this shows is.
B: that you are an idiot; Gregoromichelaki et al., 2013).
CONCURRENT FEEDBACK AND MONITORING
As noted in Section External Modification, speakers can be
affected by addressees’ concurrent verbal and non-verbal feed-
back, including looks of puzzlement or surprise, queries, and
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acknowledgments. We propose that the speaker does not treat
such feedback as a separate message involving an independent
derived production command but rather integrates the feedback
into her own production command via monitoring. This form
of monitoring involves input from the addressee (and is in that
sense a form of other-monitoring) but affects the speaker’s own
production command. In other words, the speaker does not
(primarily at least) monitor the feedback itself but rather treats
the feedback as an external input to self-monitoring and repair.
Let us return to Figure 1. The speaker performs self-
monitoring by comparing the predicted utterance percept with
the utterance percept to produce a discrepancy that is then
input into an updated production command. We assume that
the addressee’s feedback affects the mechanisms involved in self-
monitoring. A confirmation (Yeah, OK, head nodding, etc.) con-
stitutes positive feedback which does not affect the discrepancy
or may even reduce it (e.g., a signal of understanding when an
utterance is produced in noise). But a query causes the speaker
to revisit the process of monitoring and, most likely, leads to a
higher discrepancy, which in turn makes it more likely that the
speaker will reformulate her production command. Note that the
persistent absence of positive feedback may appear sufficiently
unusual to serve as an indication of some form of difficulty
(Bavelas et al., 2000).
Following a query, the speaker needs to identify the location
and cause of difficulty. Speakers are presumably aware of the
likely lag between an utterance and an addressee’s indication of
misunderstanding (if it occurs) and they can therefore determine
the locus of difficulty. They can also use the type of feedback as an
indication of the cause of difficulty. Consider (3), from Horton
and Gerrig (2005).
(3) A: and um it- you know it’s rea- it’s it was really good and of
course she teaches theology that was another thing
B: mm
A: I- m- I- Isabelle
B: oh that’s great.
Here, A treats B’s mm as an indication of failure to understand,
and presumably infers the locus as the underspecified referring
expression she. A responds by switching to the more explicit
Isabelle, a strategy which appears to be successful. In this example,
the large discrepancy resulting from B’s mm generated an inverse
model that led to reformulation of A’s production command (in
this case, the command to produce explicit reference). A similar
situation is illustrated in (1), where Lesley’s interjection Forty nine
wha:t? involves some reduplication of the original utterance in a
way that can help Hal’s reformulation.
MONITORING AND ALIGNMENT
Pickering and Garrod (2004) pointed out that interlocutors tend
to align with each other, for example choosing the same words,
syntactic structures, or phonology as each other. Such alignment
underlies conversational success, which occurs when interlocutors
align their understanding of a situation (to a sufficient extent) and
provides an explanation of why interlocutors are not overcome by
the complexity of coordinating their activity with another person
(Garrod and Pickering, 2004).
Alignment clearly assists other-monitoring, because it means
that the comprehender’s predictions about the speaker’s upcom-
ing utterance are more likely to be correct. Informally, if I am suf-
ficiently similar to you, I can predict your behavior by predicting
what I would do myself, and the same is as true for language as
any other action. When the comprehender is different from the
speaker, he can accommodate to differences between them, but of
course such adaptation is likely to be imperfect (because of limited
knowledge of his partner and potential egocentric biases). The
more similar the interlocutors are, the less this will be necessary.
For example, a comprehender may be unable to predict whether a
speaker will utter chef or cook; but after one or both of them has
used the term cook, the comprehender can now predict that the
speaker will utter cook. (In fact, alignment may make the speaker
more confident that she will utter cook as well.)
Of course, the speaker is actually more likely to utter cook
under these circumstances. Thus the comprehender experiences
a reduction in uncertainty in both the utterance percept and the
predicted utterance percept. This also leads to a reduction in
discrepancy, and so the comprehender is more likely to construct
an accurate derived production command and not have to leave
the language processing system (or engage in extensive conflict-
monitoring). In turn, co-composition and feedback are more
likely to be supportive and confirmatory—interlocutors will tend
to contribute to a successful joint activity.
One way in which monitoring can help alignment has just
been noted: Interjections that result from other-monitoring often
involve some repetition. Thus, Forty nine wha:t? repeats two words
and the syntactic structure of forty nine g’rillas. It may be that
the Lesley is aligning with Hal’s utterance (i.e., via priming), or
it may be that the form of her interjection is designed to facilitate
Hal’s repair (so that Hal is more likely to realize the nature of the
problem). According to Pickering and Garrod (2004), linguistic
repetition enhances alignment.
Finally, interlocutors can use the output of other-monitoring
to estimate the success or otherwise of an interaction. (It is
possible that the output of self-monitoring can also be used to
some extent.) Informally, if the comprehender makes accurate
predictions about the speaker’s utterances, he will assume that the
conversation is “flowing” well. In other words, if the discrepancies
are consistently low, the interaction appears to be successful,
and he will conclude that he is likely to be well-aligned with
the speaker. As successful conversations involve an increase in
alignment, he will in fact expect the discrepancy to reduce over
time. If this does not happen, the comprehender will tend to
focus on repair strategies (e.g., more clear indications of misun-
derstanding) or make an explicit attempt to “restart” (e.g., “Let’s
try another tack”), something which might prove particularly
frequent in arguments and adversarial negotiation. In general,
we can regard this potentially long-term use of other-monitoring
(e.g., to determine change of discrepancy over time) as involv-
ing metacognitive processes that may in themselves emphasize
mentalizing.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have provided an account of monitoring
that applies to both language production (self-monitoring) and
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language comprehension (other-monitoring), and to both mono-
logue (where speaker and addressee roles are clearly distinct)
and dialogue (where interlocutors play both roles). The account
assumes that both comprehenders and producers predict upcom-
ing utterances, and the process of monitoring involves comparing
predicted with actual utterances. It suggests that the processes
involved in predicting and monitoring self and other will engage
largely the same neural systems in similar ways, and will lead
to similar patterns of breakdown. Our paper seeks to explicate
the process of monitoring, and assumes that people compute
the discrepancy between the predicted and actual utterances and
use this to modify the command that underlies the producer’s
utterance (the production command) or the comprehender’s
assumption about the producer’s utterance (the derived produc-
tion command). Such modification is sometimes straightforward,
but sometimes requires the comprehender (or, more rarely, the
producer) to construct a new command. We propose that dia-
logue tends to reduce the difficulty of such modification, because
interlocutors tend to become aligned to each other. In conclusion,
our account seeks to provide a unified explanation of monitoring,
but we argue that it also shows how monitoring is not a peripheral
component of language processing but rather central to everyday
language use.
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